Star Wars and Earth Infantrymen 2

Written by the Solar Collective in February 2025
Signed anonymously

Every day, the White House delivers a new shock to the world, as if unpredictability were the only real constant in Washington. Some are convinced there is a method to the madness—an underlying strategy behind the chaos—while others suspect there is only madness to the method. Most, however, are left grasping for explanations, caught between the spectacle and the shifting ground beneath their feet.

On January 27, Donald signed an executive order titled “The Iron Dome for America” which directs the Department of Defense to deliver with a deadline of 60 days, a reference architecture, capabilities-based requirements, and an implementation plan for a next-generation comprehensive missile defense system, protecting from ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.



This is 6 years after the similarly ambitious creation of the space force, as well as the Missile Review that he unveiled at the Pentagon, whose aims could be very well summarised with the following quotation:

> “Our goal is simple: to ensure that we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States anywhere, anytime, anyplace”

The envisioned system is sought to include: interceptors placed in orbit, which would be capable of boost-phase interception of adversary missiles; the Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer (a ‘tracking layer’ system); as well as the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (a ‘custody layer’ system).

The United States already at the very least possesses fragments of, and is actively developing the ‘Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture’ (PWSA). The PWSA is intended to be a comprehensive satellite network designed to enhance defense capabilities through multiple interconnected layers, each serving a specific function.[1]

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[1] Communication transport layer - low latency data transport **;** tracking layer - global persistent (early) detection, equipped with infrared sensors, it detects launched missiles, including hypersonic ones **;** custody layer - maintains continuous tracking of time sensitive targets (decoys and warheads), ensuring persistent monitoring throughout their trajectory, is able to detect any evasive maneuvering **;** ect.

Rotting in his grave, old Reagan faces a dilemma, does he develop an admiration for big Don, or does he weep for his long gone America, being dragged down from its victorious position by the protectionists that he denounced and politically campaigned against on so many occasions. Well, he is too dead to care, and for all we care - may Allah bring him up to Jannah or let him burn for eternity.

Yesterday

Even before Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (the 'star wars' programme), the United States already possessed a kind of satellite early warning system. Radars can be made very big and powerful but are obviously restricted by the curvature of the Earth, this can be somewhat circumvented through high altitude aerial reconnaissance, those planes meant to stay far behind the battlefield, fitted out with an entire armament of long range sensors that you see in the pictures every now and then. But with a limited airspace in which you can sustain dominance, and with the presence of an adversary such as the Soviet Union controlling an inconceivably vast territory. It is then impossible to detect the ICBM in its boost or early midcourse phase, and that's where the satellites come into play.

As a reaction to the launch of Sputnik 1 and 2, which were very powerful demonstrations of the capability of the USSR to launch a surprise ICBM attack directly against the United States and its allies, the aforementioned government, along with Canada and Denmark, agreed to build an early warning radar system. This system only gave 10-25 minutes of warning time in the case of an ICBM attack, which may not have been enough time for the nuclear bombers to take off, making a successful surprise disarming attack on key elements of the western nuclear triad a possibility. And besides that with ground based radars, there is always the problem of atmospheric interference due to the fact that they could only observe the missile for a limited amount of its midcourse stage[2]. This was the birth of MIDAS (missile defense alarm system) which was added to the WS-117 air force programme in 1957, and aimed to double that time to about 45 mins - 1 hour with the use of infrared laser detection and simple RF communication[3] back to the ground.

MIDAS represented the United States' first attempt at creating a comprehensive space-based early warning system, with its focus on detecting the heat signatures of missile launches from orbit. Its failures, however, reflected the limits of early satellite technology: unreliable sensors, launch vehicle malfunctions, and data communication issues plagued the program. By 1966, the program was canceled, and its remnants were folded into more advanced efforts, such as the Defense Support Program (DSP), which

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[2] Non-space-based interceptors by themselves, such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), are limited to observation of the terminal phase, giving them a very short engagement window (seconds to a minute) and reduced accuracy.

[3] The RF capacities at the time did not allow for full images to be transmitted

would serve as the cornerstone of missile detection through much of the Cold War and beyond.

The DSP satellites, developed during the late 1960s and deployed throughout the Reagan era, succeeded where MIDAS failed. They utilized infrared sensors to detect the thermal plumes of missile launches from geosynchronous orbit, providing crucial early warning capabilities[4]. However, even the DSP had its limitations - it was ill-suited for tracking the weaker infrared signatures of missiles during their midcourse or terminal phases, where decoys, atmospheric reentry, and maneuverable warheads additionally complicated detection, and it was only capable of staying in a geosynchronous orbit. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) sought to address these shortcomings by integrating a more ambitious system of orbital sensors and famously, of interceptors located directly in space.

The SDI, announced in 1983, envisioned a multilayered defense system that would expand beyond mere detection into interception, including proposals for:

1. Space-based interceptors ("Brilliant Pebbles") capable of shooting down missiles in an earlier part of its midcourse stage, with a global coverage area.
2. Boost-phase tracking systems designed to engage missiles during the earliest stage of their trajectory, potentially neutralizing them before multiple warheads or decoys could deploy.
3. A robust network of satellites, radars, and communication systems to track, identify, and intercept warheads in real-time.



Yet, despite billions in funding, many SDI projects remained experimental. Medium earth orbit detection and tracking systems like Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS)[5] were studied but never operationalized due to the lack of needed precision in infrared detection systems present at the time, and besides that, due to the enormous cost of the programme with the time's launch costs and little advancements in MEO satellites in the face of a waning need for it with an actively collapsing USSR. The envisioned constellation of autonomous kinetic orbital interceptors faced similar barriers -

[4] During Desert Storm, for example, DSP was able to detect the launches of Iraqi Scud missiles

[5] Meant as an upgrade to the DSP satellites, which would incorporate the previously mentioned capacity of dynamic tracking or 'keeping in custody' of missiles

the technology was not there yet to reliably intercept multiple targets moving at Mach 20+[6], or to distinguish between real and decoy missiles and warheads, leading to the need to deploy an economically impossible amount of space interceptors for the desired scope of the programme, and all of this with the consideration of the fact that against submarine and cruise missiles deployed from a closer distance, conventional ground based systems that were capable of midcourse interception would do the same job, making the expensive endeavour an inefficient use of resources in the opportunity sense.

Another elementary problem with such a system would be the reactive countermeasures implemented by the adversary. If the U.S. were to deploy a vast constellation of space-based interceptors, the Soviet Union would not sit idly by. The logical response was to see this as a progressive offensive, aimed at launching a preemptive strike without retaliatory consequence and therefore to respond to this progressive offensive. There could have been symmetrical deployments — the USSR could develop its own orbital defense measures, creating a new frontier for military competition, but that did not happen. Additionally, the potential for asymmetrical countermeasures was just as real and was heavily invested into: maneuverable warheads, decoys, electronic jamming, and direct-energy weapons, the production of anti-satellite weaponry accompanied by threats to use it on components of the american programme, legitimizing such activity on the grounds of the '72 treaty and attempting to rile 'international opinion' against the United States as an unreliable 'nuclear peace partner'. All of this could contribute to the ability to neutralise or degrade the effectiveness of such a system.

More broadly, the risk of further escalatory military spending was clear. The Strategic Defense Initiative was already stretching the limits of U.S. defense budgets, with estimates that a fully realized space-based missile defense system could cost hundreds of billions—if not trillions of dollars over time. If the Soviets pursued a counter-SDI program, both nations could be dragged into an economically ruinous arms race, echoing the logic of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, but now extended into space itself.

And then came the issue of international treaties. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by both the U.S. and USSR, prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons in space, but it remained unclear whether purely kinetic interceptors would violate the spirit of the agreement. More critically, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 explicitly restricted the deployment of missile defense systems to avoid disrupting strategic stability, as the ability of one party to achieve total interception capacity also meant that it would be capable of launching a preemptive offensive against the other party without the fear of a response. In this way its cities and critical infrastructure cannot be 'held hostage', and it could eradicate the nuclear strike power of any state on the planet, completely disabling MAD. Reagan's SDI openly defied the logic of this treaty, and while the U.S. technically

[6] In the case of the US and its main adversaries this is basically a necessity, as interception in the boost phase (3-5) is impossible without the presence of very particular circumstances.

remained compliant at first, the program's long-term goals sought to dismantle this balance.

Today

At its core, the failure of SDI—and specifically Brilliant Pebbles—was not just a matter of technological feasibility, but also of strategic and political viability. The collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991 further diminished the urgency of such an ambitious project, and without a clear adversary of equivalent capability, the justification for funding a massive orbital missile defense system crumbled. While some elements of SDI research would be repurposed in later missile defense efforts—such as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system—the dream of an autonomous, space-based missile shield remained just that: a dream, constrained by both the technological limits of its time and the complex strategic realities of nuclear deterrence.

Aside from being pursued purely for the purposes of economic stimulation or of the infatuation of the populus with the mythological conception of deterrent and reactive 'defense' and 'security'[7], the dynamic that is the most interesting for us here is how the introduction of such projects serve as clear demonstrations of the long-time abandonment of the *doctrine* of nuclear deterrence. They aim at 'saving the cities taken hostage' and in fact it's a very poetic inversion - the nuclear weapons pointing at each other that appear as weapons really act as shields. The defense systems meant to disable these missiles appear as shields, but by doing that protect that which was held hostage by the enemy, leaving them open for an attack.

Establishing a well functioning, layered, space based "Iron Dome for America" in the imaginary scenario where no other power would respond and launch their own programmes before the coverage of the American interception system can become necessarily global and saturated in order to intercept any kind of high altitude nuclear missile, the Americans' cost of waging an offensive war with the aim to achieve concrete objectives (negotiation or unconditional surrender) with world superpowers would reduce enormously in comparison to its competitors.

As we mentioned previously, in the 70s, this was somewhat the line along which the USSR attempted to rally 'international outrage' against the States as being ambitious in nuclear aggression, and attempted to 'legitimize' its counter threat to preemptively attack any partial installation of this system, but because systems like the brilliant pebbles were never actually implemented, the counter threat never had the chance to materialize.

Today the USSR no longer exists. Additionally the American commitment to the '72 treaty was withdrawn in 2002 by the Bush administration, making a space interceptor programme technically a legal endeavour on the stage of international treaties. The

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[7] A false sense of security being provoked by the use of ambiguous language and advertisement. Something talked about in an unpublished essay "Our Problems, Our Solutions" *Esperanza #1* written by a friend of ours from the rtc [comrades.sbs]

Russians[8] and the Chinese[9] are concerned with a very similar narrative about the United States wishing to undermine the international 'nuclear order of peace'. We see a similar outrage, and almost an identical counter threat of further development of anti satellite tech by China, and the further development of the (very much overhyped) advanced manoeuvrability and evasion capabilities for high altitude missiles by Russia.

Both respective countermeasure strategies must be studied in depth, and of course we have to account for the fact that we are currently only capable of working with widely known/distributed, leaked, and declassified information, which may give us a limited picture.

But let's imagine for a moment, say in the next few years the first working models of these interceptors get sent up into orbit - say the Chinese threaten to shoot it with anti-satellites, and the US now steps in and presents this to the world as a case of a Chinese threat of aggression against it's defensive capabilities (this is where the bipolar language regarding nuclear offense and defense could really shine!), and would threaten to retaliate against Chinese defensive systems in return. What if they do decide to shoot it down or carry out large scale cyber attacks against such systems? What if instead they build and send up their own space-based interceptors? A world of possibilities opens up, there emerge additional dimensions to the nuclear standoff.

With kinetic strikes in space now a reality, treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 become little more than artifacts of a more naïve era. The legal frameworks that once sought to preserve space as a neutral domain erode under the weight of new military realities, and before long, the first nuclear-powered—or even WMD armed—platforms begin appearing in low-Earth orbit.

The shift happens gradually at first—trial launches, quiet deployments, a handful of contested incidents written off as miscalculations. But once the first space-based weapons cross the threshold from theory to doctrine, restraint becomes impossible. A tit-for-tat logic sets in: one nation tests an orbital kinetic interceptor, another counters with a maneuverable strike platform. The next logical step is taken not because it is rational, but because it is inevitable.

What was once an arena of intelligence gathering and communication infrastructure is now the new front line of military strategy. Nuclear triads become nuclear tetrads, with

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[8] "It (the plan) directly envisages a significant strengthening of the American nuclear arsenal and means for conducting combat operations in space, including the development and deployment of space-based interception systems,"
"We consider this as another confirmation of the U.S. focus on turning space into an arena of armed confrontation... and the deployment of weapons there"
Zakharova told reporters at a news briefing in Moscow.
[https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-condemns-trump-missile-defence-shield-plan-accuses-us-plotting-militarise-2025-01-31/]

[9] *Managing the Impact of Missile Defense on U.S.-China Strategic Stability*, T. Zhao
[https://www.amacad.org/publication/missile-defense-and-strategic-relationship-among-united-states-russia-and-china/section/2]

space joining land, sea, and air as a domain of strategic deterrence. But deterrence itself is not what it used to be. In this new calculus, mutual vulnerability—the very principle that was supposed to hold the Cold War in check—is being replaced by a desperate scramble for superiority. The question then becomes no longer *if* a nation can guarantee second-strike capability, but whether it can prevent a first strike altogether.

Military breakthroughs do not resolve the contradictions of war; they amplify them. Every advance in precision demands an even greater expansion of infrastructure. The further the battlefield extends—from trenches to skies, from skies to orbit—the more war strains against its own material limits. It does not become more controlled, only more sprawling, more entangled in the vast networks of production, deployment, and sustainment that keep it running.

The fantasy of the autonomous war machine is, in reality, the deepening of war's contradictions. The more warfare relies on machines, the more it depends on the uninterrupted extraction of resources, the refinement of rare materials, the assembly of complex weapons systems, the maintenance of sprawling logistics chains. Even the most advanced killing machine must be produced by labor, transported by labor, and sustained by labor. War cannot escape its material base—it only expands its dependencies.

Of course, capitalism seeks to overcome this limit. It refines its methods, enclosing more of war's logistical functions within specialized, insulated layers of the workforce. The military-industrial complex does not just produce weapons; it produces a caste of workers who are bound to its needs, whether as weapons developers, engineers, or enlisted soldiers—individuals whose labor is secured not just by wages, but by status, ideology, and social enclosures. It is no accident that the more expensive and complex war becomes, the more it is sustained by an increasingly aristocratic workforce. A military scientist is not a disposable proletarian, but an integrated functionary. The soldier, too, is instead—not as a conscript of the masses, but as a member of the "military family," sustained by institutional benefits and a sense of belonging.

This is the capitalist response to the unsustainable demands of mass mobilization: replace the many with the few, and secure the few through privilege, allegiance, and enclosure. It is no longer the factory worker or the peasant being thrown into the furnace of war—it is the specialized technician, the career officer, the private contractor, the special forces dude. And yet, even this does not resolve the contradiction.

Because in the wars that matter most—those that threaten the very order of states—machines alone do not suffice. High-tech, professionalized militaries may excel in limited engagements, in precision operations where the enemy is presumed to be technologically inferior, but when war becomes a sustained contest—when an adversary refuses to be decisively crushed—mass mobilization returns with full force.

This is not just true of great-power conflicts. The wars fought against supposedly weaker foes—the Viet Cong, the Taliban, the Iraqi insurgents—did not fail because they

were asymmetrical, but precisely because they became symmetrical over time. The more resources the dominant power poured in, the more the enemy adapted, matched their strategy, and turned the war into one of endurance. If the war in Vietnam had truly been an asymmetric conflict, it would have ended in a clean, overwhelming victory. If Afghanistan had been merely a counterinsurgency against an outmatched foe, there would be no Taliban government in Kabul today. The fact that these wars dragged on for years—decades, in some cases—proves that they were contests of survival, battles in which the so-called "weaker" side managed to impose its own terms of engagement. And in such wars, firepower alone does not guarantee victory.

Ukraine today serves as a brutal reminder that despite all advancements in automation, in drones, in precision-guided weapons, wars of attrition still demand bodies. The same is true of the global arms buildup: China, Russia, even NATO states are quietly preparing for wars they know cannot be fought purely through elite forces and machines. Even in the most automated militaries, there is a breaking point at which technology no longer compensates for sheer numbers. When territory must be held, when occupations must be maintained, when prolonged warfare exhausts the standing forces, the state has no choice but to return to the old method: mobilizing, conscripting, and arming masses of men to die for the interests of capital. If anything, this contradiction is sharpening. The more that capitalism tries to shift war away from mass mobilization, the more catastrophic it becomes when such mobilization becomes unavoidable.

> “Modern warfare suffers, more than that of the past, from a fundamental contradiction between the destructive power of the fighting units or the means employed, and the impossibility of moving, relocating, and supplying the masses of millions of men necessary to bring the war itself towards the achievement of a concrete, tangible result, negotiable with the enemy or usable to impose unconditional surrender.
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> This is the contradiction on which the communist revolution can rely, perhaps the most favourable, since, as Lenin states, nothing is more favourable to revolution than a mass of millions of proletarians in arms.” - Star Wars and Earth Infantrymen[10]

[10] Published as a brochure by the PCInt. on April 28th, 1983 in Turin [https://solarcollective.comrades.sbs/assets/pdfs/Star%20Wars%20and%20Earth%20Infantrymen.pdf]